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Why do cultures change ?
The challenges of globalization 
Alain Suberchicot
University of Lyon (IETT-Lyon 3)
We are  always  in  need  of  definitions  whenever  we want  to  explore  why cultures 
change. We are pressed to come up with answers as to what culture might be and how the idea 
of culture might fit  into a nutshell. The general applicability of the answer we struggle to 
devise invites theoretical formulas and abstraction from specific historical developments. It 
also, as a result, cautions us to choose fields from which to cull situations and conflicts that 
may help deliver  the concepts  we want  to grasp,  and invites  to  understand the theory of 
culture as shaped by how events unfold, and how society moves along. In particular, one may 
have  in  mind  what  the  American  philosopher  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  once  wrote  about 
Napoleon (our favourite dictator;  to us French people) in a book he devoted to figures of 
historical importance (Representative Men): “Such a man was wanted, and such a man was 
born”1. This strikes a negative note, as does a quote from Napoleon himself that Emerson has 
unearthed from the vast body of memoirs the Napoleon era has handed down to us. Emerson 
is reported to have once declared: “My hand of iron […] was not at the extremity of my arm; 
it was immediately connected with my head”2.  The remark and the quote hold a tentative 
definition of culture. Culture begins when sheer force is mitigated by intellect, intellect itself 
being shaped by a response to facts, and, we hope, as Emerson hopes, abstracted from fact by 
ethical  imperative.  On all this, we feel  Emerson’s attempt at rationality is run through by 
doubt: what if one might never discriminate between intellect and action? What if one might 
never  grasp how ethics  can disengage us  from the  cogs  of  history and was incapable  of 
controlling an ongoing process that leads to disaster and apocalypse? Whenever one tries to 
define culture,  culture breaks down into its  many components:  it  splinters  into action and 
responsibility,  and  we  feel  there  might  never  be  a  connection  between  them.  There  lies 
Emerson’s historical pessimism, which it is hard to tone down. 
In recent years, a debate has been brought to the foreground, for reasons that have to 
do with our increasingly globalizing world.  Are there any values left?  If  such a  thing as 
culture exists, then, there might be precise contents of an ethical sort that we want to pin 
down. Might not this sense of emptiness be the result of a crisis of value, as if the very idea of 
value had been swept away? This is what the French cultural critic Hubert Damisch thinks has 
happened,  in  a  recent  contribution  to  a  volume  aptly  titled  Which  Values  for  our  Time, 
published by the Gulbenkian Foundation of Lisbon. Damisch rounds up his interrogation as 
follows: “Crisis  of values,  or crisis  value?”3 The suggestion is  of course that  value is  no 
longer visible on the horizon of our history to be, that the trend should be resisted, and that 
intellectual  resistance  is  what  we  need.  It  is  by  no  means  new  to  be  aware,  among 
philosophers and cultural critics alike, that values are hard to come by. In Plato’s  Republic, 
book seven, humankind is looking at the walls of a cave, noting the shadows dancing there, 
and  being  taught  that  our  poor  sight  precludes  the  perception  of  good and evil,  and  the 
difference between them. Now that the walls of the cave have turned into television screens, 
one image is chased away by the next one, while our sense of global responsibility dissolves 
into thin air even though all the fields of human action hold perspectives of responsibility in 
1 Ralph Waldo Emerson « Napoleon ; or, the man of the world »,  Essays and Lectures, Joel Porte, ed., New 
York, The Library of America, 1983, 731. 
2 Emerson, 731. 
3 Hubert Damisch, « A Crisis of Values, or Crisis Value ? », Which Values for our Time, Daniel S. Hamilton, ed., 
Lisbon,  Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns Hopkins University, 
2007, 57. 
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them. Culture, like values, is both a plenum and a void, a constant expectation and in the end 
an impossibility when one looks at results and facts. 
We should keep in mind Jacques Derrida’s anthropology of culture, and the degree to 
which  it  identifies  conflict  as  the  prime-mover  within  our  cultural  narratives.  In  a  major 
contribution at a Cerisy conference in Normandy in 1980, titled “On a Newly Arisen Superior 
Tone in Philosophy”4, Jacques Derrida opposes two sets of attitudes: seeking rationality, and 
seeking mystery.  Derrida views culture  as the competition between the  Aüfklarer and the 
mystics, and suggests there are possibilities that the two trends in cultural discourse might 
eventually reach some kind of truce achieved as a result of an interaction between them. No 
doubt he was trying to hold historical pessimism at a distance by suggesting gain might be 
reached in the historical development of cultures if rationality was capable of reading through 
the language of mysticism, and curb the influence of those he chose to call the mystagogues, 
in whom he saw a danger for democracy and human dignity. Cultures change, and when they 
do, they are pulled in opposite directions if we abide by Derrida’s critical  thinking.  They 
change to eliminate reason, even, as Derrida puts it, to emasculate it, and we must, as a result, 
apply  pressure  to  preserve  amity,  and  to  uphold  the  values  of  democracy.  To  be  sure, 
Derrida’s onslaught upon mystery is no onslaught upon religious values: there are many other 
targets  we  might  think  of  in  the  current  context  of  globalized  liberal  economies  and 
environmental overuse, such as religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and the emergence of a 
global self-appointed élite, although Derrida’s inquiry was started some thirty years ago, and 
he never gets that precise about what should be indicted. 
Disaster and apocalypse
Our globalizing  societies  offer  alternatives  to  an ideal  world.  In particular,  market 
mechanisms and the rise of global capital  have impoverished some non-European nations, 
while Europe has, in recent years, worked to thin the immigration flux while downsizing out 
of their jobs the low-skilled workers of a once predominantly industrial economy that has now 
turned to services. As a result, local communities have been struck, either in Europe or the 
United States, by being impoverished within the more glitzy context of affluence. In China as 
elsewhere, industrial  activity has surged, while working conditions have never been worse 
among the former peasants driven to urban areas. Globalization may well pass for an agenda 
of disaster and social apocalypse, as Joseph Stiglitz has demonstrated5. Welfare and human 
rights have hardly benefited from the promise economic liberalism keeps harping on, and 
human development has been restricted to the rising middle-classes of China, or India, if we 
look at the most significant examples. Richard Rorty, meditating on social hope, has brought 
home the idea that globalization has been a blow to democracy. He wrote the following in an 
essay  published  in  1993:  “We  now  have  a  global  overclass  which  makes  all  the  major 
economic decisions, and makes them in entire independence of the legislatures, and a fortiori 
of  the  will  of  the  voters,  of  any  given  country”6.  Rorty’s  remark  comes  as  an  apposite 
reminder that there is no such thing as a world government, a fact that we all tend to overlook. 
The ideology of economic growth heralds human development, but delivers little in terms of 
the strengthening of local communities,  both in rising nations as well as in Western ones. 
4 Peter Fenves, ed., Raising the Tone of Philosophy ; Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by  
Jacques Derrida, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, 117-171; French edition: 
“D’un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie », Les Fins de l’Homme: à partir du travail de Jacques  
Derrida, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe et Jean-Luc Nancy, eds., Paris, Galilée, 1981, 445-479. 
5 See in particular  Making Globalization Work, New York, Norton, [2006] 2007, chap. 7, “The Multinational 
Corporation”. 
6 Richard Rorty, « Globalization, the politics of identity and Social Hope”, Philosophy and Social Hope, London, 
Penguin, 1999, 233. 
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Might  not  this  ideology  form the  most  recent  embodiment  of  some  pseudo-thinking  the 
mystagogues parade as rationality for us to kneel to? 
Communities,  we hear,  have  gone  global,  which  means  they  are  now glocal.  The 
portmanteau-word means more than it seems to say. On the one hand, the buzzword suggests 
that local communities may be strengthened by globalization; on the other, it suggests that 
local communities are shaped, in ways that cannot all be positive, by the advance of global 
liberalism. However, one of the unsought effects of glocalization may well be that cultural 
interference with distant or unknown communities might emerge from the pressure of global 
liberalism, by dissolving national, or even nationalist perspectives, and favouring international 
contacts.  Let us be cautious in this:  international  interaction,  in the context of globalizing 
economic exchange, may well be no other than buying and selling, and one more version of 
materialism without national values being cross-fertilized. 
Globalization cannot control the rise of a new conservatism,  in spite of the surge in 
optimism that comes with it in some quarters, if we look at the poor condition of welfare 
systems across developed countries and elsewhere. As Habermas has pointed out, “modernity 
sees itself as dependent exclusively upon itself”7, and utopian ideals are increasingly wiped 
out of the Zeitgeist.  Globalization is in dire need of strengthening, not exhausting, utopian 
energies. If it proves incapable of effecting this, renewing utopian energies, the road down 
globalization may well be what one supposes it to be from recent evidence, a hurdle-race, 
with  one  winner,  a  few athletes  of  note,  and  vast  crowds  of  anonymous  losers.  Jacques 
Derrida has pointed out that we need peace in culture, and that peace can be achieved when 
the mystagogues accept to interact with rationality.  Rationality however, to him, is not an 
empty bottle, or an instrument by which societies may solve practical questions. Rationality 
involves moral choice, and one may well suggest that the Habermas notion that utopian ideals 
have to be upheld is the best way to reorder, and refashion global liberalism. No doubt, the 
culture wars must go on, to stay the current backlash and its related traumas, terrorism East 
and  West,  the  political  violence  within  national  borders  and  without,  the  religious 
fundamentalism which has found in globalization its ecotope, in Israel, in the Arab world, in 
the United States,  and elsewhere, while environmental  disasters from North to South take 
their toll upon communities. Cultures, as a result of globalization, change, for reasons that 
have to do with the innate systemic risks that globalization runs through them, risks which are 
supra-human,  but  which,  for  that  very  reason,  have  to  be  identified,  deconstructed,  and 
eliminated, although we do know that this process cannot be the work of one sole generation. 
Indifference as well as naïveté ought to be avoided. If, as Habermas thinks they are, utopian 
values are used-up, because they are targeted, then, they must be invigorated. 
No doubt any such invigoration, if we want it to have pragmatic efficiency, calls for 
specific measures, and precautions. Intellectual clarity can help. And meditation upon what is 
and what is not scientific can be an asset. It is true odium has been cast on the precautionary 
principle by some scholars of environmental  studies. In a fairly recent issue (2004) of the 
M.I.T. Press quarterly Global Environmental Polictics, scholars Emery Roe and Michel Van 
Eeten have condemned the precautionary principle in matters of environmental policy on the 
grounds that scientific evidence is not sufficient, calling for empirical knowledge, supposed to 
be an index to what is and what is not scientific8. Is it that globalization has reshaped the 
image of science in academia, making us wistful once again, and inviting us to find peace of 
mind in a belated version of science which is reminiscent of the nineteenth century,  when 
science was largely considered to rely on empirical observation, whatever this might mean? 
7 Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism ; Cultural Criticism and the Historian’s debate, Cambridge, Mass., 
The M.I.T. Press, 1989 [5th printing, 1997], 48. 
8 Emery Roe and Michel  J.G. Van Eeten,  « Three – Not Two – Major Environmental  Counternarratives  to 
Globalization”, Global Environmental Politics, 4:4, November 2004; see in particular 36-39. 
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Empiricism  and  dogmatic  thinking  are  birds  of  a  feather  flocking  together.  More  open 
intellectual attitudes are necessary to face the risks of globalization upon our environment. 
Doubt, in particular, may be protective, in this respect. Without it, scientific thinking can be 
stultified. Science cannot be independent of general interest and social respect, and requires 
critical detachment to shelter us from the systemic dangers inherent in its objects of inquiry 
and the applicability of its fundamental findings. In scientific knowledge as well, the culture 
wars loom large,  though they tend to be overlooked. These wars may lead both ways:  to 
cultural changes that will crush social hope, and to cultural changes that will uplift a sense of 
community and cooperation. 
The secularization of value
The values of science, therefore, should be secularized,  and scientists should avoid 
generating  systems  which  hold  dangers  in  them  that  might  express  their  potential  for 
destruction. The French philosopher and Stanford scholar Jean-Pierre Dupuy has pointed out 
that the atomic bombing of Japan was the result of systemic danger, in an amazing remark: 
“Why was the bomb ever used? Because it existed, quite simply”9. The implication of what he 
says is that science too, and what was at one point presented as an advance of the civilized 
mind, may lead to pragmatic consequences that reshape thinking and emasculate it, if we want 
to harp on the Derrida proposition that the mystagogues are able to emasculate rationality (let 
us pardon Derrida’s male chauvinism if we can). Human thinking involves systemic dangers, 
and  one  therefore  has  to  rethink  thinking  in  different  terms,  which  has  been  the  task  of 
modern philosophy. Perhaps we might suggest at this point that cultural change involves the 
thinking of rationality in secularized terms. This means that technology may well  lead us 
astray, tethered as it is to scientific knowledge which we tend to view as total, whereas any 
inquiry into the results of science tends to demonstrate that science is provisional, and that its 
propositions  will  sooner  or  later  be  refined,  or  redefined,  and  that  intellectual  inquiry, 
whatever  its  field,  rarely  comes  to  conclusions  that  will  never  be  reworded,  or  revised. 
Knowledge is an ongoing process, and if we keep this in mind, we secularize science, instead 
of projecting it onto the higher plane of superior frozen truths. Science, like any other human 
adventure, unfolds through time, and taking this into consideration helps science respond to 
social needs. 
Political  scientists  are  struggling  for  secular  views,  as  John  Rawls  has  amply 
demonstrated. Behind his eulogy of democracy as a condition and an effect of economic and 
political liberalism, one finds an attempt to define the nature of rationality as the mainspring 
of  social  hope.  It  is  striking,  when  reading  John  Rawls,  to  realise  the  extent  to  which 
rationality is assessed in conjunction with its effects upon social organization, which yields 
workable political  conceptions of justice. John Rawls, in his second major opus,  Political  
Liberalism, defines political rationality as outcome-centered, and this leads to a list of primary 
goods, which reads as follows:
a. basic rights and liberties […];
b. freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities;
c. powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and economic 
institutions of the basic structure; 
d. income and wealth; and finally;
e. the social bases of self-respect.10 
9 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Petite Métaphysique des Tsunamis, Paris, Seuil, 2005, 85. 
10 John Rawls,  Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, 181. Joseph Stiglitz follows 
suits with a set of more technical criteria in  Making Globalization Work; see the section “Responding to the 
Democratic Deficit”, 280-285. 
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Rawls’  agenda  relies  on  the  traditions  of  the  common-sense  philosophy  of  the  English-
speaking world and the theoretical culture of pragmatism, which he found ready for use in his 
New-England  intellectual  environment.  Nowhere  do  we  find  perspectives  that  would  be 
disconnected from and independent  of day-to-day preoccupations.  Rawls wants to harness 
human development to democracy, to wring democracy out of economic growth, while there 
is  an  increasing  belief,  in  this  century,  that  our  globalized  economies  hold  a  promise  of 
democracy as an expectation which will always be contradicted by fact. Just recently,  in a 
major contribution to the debate, the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek has pointed out that 
China allies a vicious use of the Asian bludgeon in Tibet with the logics of the European 
stock-market,  and  that  this  betrays  the  belief  that  democracy  is  an  obstacle  to  economic 
growth. As a result of this, Zizek’s assumption is that our global culture might be brought to 
understand that democracy is no longer needed to back human development, which might 
lead global cultural change in the wrong direction11. Democracy has to be maintained as a 
horizon of belief, and as the sole teleology worthy of respect. Rawls helps us understand that 
teleology should be one version of practicality,  though we tend to think that any political 
teleology is an empty promise. His contribution to political philosophy views rationality not 
just as a belated version of theology, but as a tool that may help deliver collective results, 
following in the footsteps of American intellectual traditions which assess value in terms of 
their pragmatic consequences rather than in terms of otherworldly conceptual exploration. 
What if, beyond this sound conception of political values, and the organic laws that go 
to  frame  them,  human  culture  was  unresponsive,  thus  precluding  cultural  change,  and 
sustainable development? It is this situation that Samuel Huntington examines, leaving little 
room  for  hope,  suggesting  that  cultures  cannot  change,  or  will  change  slowly  or  with 
difficulty, on the grounds that society will not change and that there is no connection between 
assumptions,  beliefs,  and the economic and political  opportunities  that  the modern  liberal 
state  offers  if  we are  willing to  grasp them.  Huntington’s  dream is  to get  rid of  cultural 
obstacles to economic development, while it is yet unclear whether there is any strong belief 
in the virtues of democracy in what he has to say. Huntington’s answer does not intend to 
demonstrate that it is democracy which has to be left out of his global picture. In his case, if 
progress is not fast enough, it is because those cultures which resist progress as seen from 
Massachusetts are obstacles which one must remove, but Huntington is no clear analyst of 
how culture and democracy might hinge. “[…] we define culture, Huntington writes, in purely 
subjective  terms as the values,  attitudes,  beliefs,  orientations,  and underlying  assumptions 
prevalent among people in a society”12. His vision of culture has left one notion unmentioned: 
What about solidarity, the cornerstone of Richard Rorty’s vision of social hope? It may well 
be that this is one value that the modern liberal state has eroded, and that solidarity is a basic 
asset to those communities forming the lesser developed countries of Africa, Latin America 
and parts of the Asian world, where welfare is weak, and institutionalized education poorly 
developed, where, for political reasons, states are not ready to reach out to populations and 
areas  left  to  their  own  resources  and  inventiveness  in  terms  of  welfare.  Huntington’s 
discourse, as a result, is a perfect illustration of the New Conservatism that Habermas has 
targeted.  Modernity,  in  Huntington’s  world-view,  is  seen  as  totally  dependent  on  itself. 
Beliefs, in particular, are taken to task, in Huntington’s definition of culture. What if beliefs 
were an adequate instrument of the progress Huntington has in mind, one notion which is 
empty enough, and which Huntington parades to conceal his conservative views? Inherited 
ideas and attitudes are more of a survival-kit than an obstacle to social cohesiveness. One 
hardly knows, when reading Huntington, whether progress, the norm of his perspective, is one 
11 Slavoj Zizek, « Le Tibet pris dans le rêve de l’autre », Le Monde Diplomatique, n° 650, mai 2008, 32. 
12 Samuel  Huntington,  « Foreword »,  Culture  Matters :  How Values  Shape  Human  Progress,  Lawrence  E. 
Harrison &,  Samuel Huntington, eds., New York, Basic Books, 2000, XV. 
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serious academic case of mystagogic thinking, or whether it may have practical applicability². 
It is arguable that progress, with Samuel Huntington, is an abstract notion. 
Asian culture turns out to be an epistemological obstacle to many political scientists. 
Once considered incapable of generating economic growth, Asian values are seen as an asset 
in the ongoing economic race, with growth rates that belittles Europe and the United States 
alike in  some quarters  of  the Asian world.  Can one blame economic  stagnation on them 
yesterday, and now say that some basic values of Asian cultures are the leverage of change 
helping  those  so-called  miracle  economies  make  some  headway?  There  may  well  be  an 
emphasis  on  hard  work  in  Chinese  culture,  but  one  cannot  see  how  this  is  specifically 
Chinese,  or  American,  or  British.  Lucian  Pye,  one  prominent  M.I.T.  scholar  in  Chinese 
studies, has suggested that Taoism and the belief in good fortune, supposed to be specific to 
Chinese  culture,  although  I  am  aware  this  might  be  challenged,  has  produced  outgoing 
dynamic character in the Chinese people, which makes them ready to grasp any opportunity 
likely to turn to their advantage. Pye’s view of Chinese culture may easily been taken to task, 
as he implies that Chinese culture leaves no room for introspection. This is most probably a 
typical misconception such as New-England protestant culture wants to bring home. Lucian 
Pye,  in  particular,  writes  the  following  when  considering  the  reasons  for  China’s  rapid 
expansion:  “This  stress  of  the  role  of  fortune  makes  for  an  outward-looking  and  highly 
reality-oriented approach to life, not an introspective one”13. This is, we guess, one academic 
version of prejudice insisting that the Chinese have no soul, and no interest for an inner life. 
Economists,  on  the  other  hand,  go  for  a  more  mundane  vision  of  China’s  development, 
harping on the capacity to attract foreign investors14. This is also quite true of many other 
rising Asian economies besides China. 
However, these considerations invite to extend our definition of culture. Culture is not 
just  simply a  cluster  of  beliefs  and attitudes  outside  the realm of  economic  and political 
development. Culture is probably much more than beliefs and attitudes. It encompasses what 
we might call material culture, in the sense that attitudes matter in economic development, 
which is no big news, if we refer to Max Weber’s understanding of the ethic of capitalism, 
shaped as it is by the sense of insecurity that goes with the necessity to devise for oneself 
advancement  in  this  world,  the  better  to  advance  in  the next  one,  or  the  higher  or  more 
sophisticated one in the rich oriental spiritual heritage. No wonder then that Derrida should 
suggest that between rationality and mystery, there is one connection to be established. And, 
in Derrida’s view of how rationality and mystery interact,  one finds an abiding agreement 
occurring, and this is of course desirable to establish peace in what he calls culture, which to 
him is  more  of  a  socially  encompassing  substance than a  mere  individual  determinant  of 
behaviour. 
Lucian Pye is interesting as an analyst of Chinese social development, not for what 
certainties he may have in store for us, but for the scepticism which his propositions will 
cause in most quarters of the academic world, and across disciplines. Examining the reasons 
for China’s economic advance, he writes that “[...] the driving force in Chinese capitalism has 
always  been  to  find  out  who  needs  what  and  to  satisfy  that  market  need”15.  One  might 
meditate for quite a while to determine whether markets are out there for anyone to grab them, 
or whether one should shape markets, create needs, and respond to one’s ambition to grow by 
being inventive. Nevertheless, Lucian Pye views the Chinese economy as a simplistic answer 
to world needs, and the capacity to adapt to them, whereas the West is seen as technology-
driven,  and culturally  more  sophisticated:  “Western firms  seek to  improve  their  products, 
13 Lucian W. Pye, « “Asian Values” : from dynamos to dominoes?», Culture Matters, 249.  
14 On this consider Françoise Lemoine, L’Economie de la Chine, Paris, La Découverte, 2006, esp. 67-68. 
15 Pye, 250. 
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strengthen  their  organizational  structures,  and  work  hard  to  get  name  recognition”16.  We 
wonder whether Chinese firms have not always tried to do precisely this, which can only be 
generalized  with  a  vast  highly  educated  workforce,  which  China  is  trying  to  obtain  by 
adequate investment in higher education. This path is promising,  from what we can judge 
when considering our Chinese students in our institutions of higher learning in Europe. 
Cultural change and the University
If  therefore,  cultures  change,  not  just  private  cultures,  but also public  ones,  as we 
increasingly suspect cultures to be, collective assets, university education has a major role to 
play in this. We, as academics, either experienced or aspiring ones, must address the issue of 
what  a university education  ought to be.  So far,  in this  discussion,  we have realized that 
academics should avoid voicing social prejudice, and this has not always been accomplished, 
to say the least. Jacques Derrida has meditated extensively on this, with a view to promoting 
the  role  education  might  play  in  defending  the  values  of  democracy,  no  doubt  because 
Derrida’s understanding of the effects of academic training is geared to the idea of a political 
education for the young. This may be easily understood when one looks at the moral paralysis 
of the German university and its many graduates embracing Nazism and providing the Nazi 
regime with its most destructive propagandists and functionaries. However, Habermas is clear 
on this. German universities cannot be blamed for what befell. Habermas, in particular, points 
out  that  the  number  of  students  was  halved  during  Nazism in  Germany,  dropping  from 
121 000 in 1933 to below 60 000 right before the second world war17. One reason why this 
happened, although Derrida is not explicit on this, is that universities tend to overspecialize 
knowledge, which has caused the decline of humanistic study. Habermas offers similar views, 
though they are cast in more sociological language. To Derrida, higher education should be 
critical  of  whatever  rationality  wants  to  assess.  He  calls  this  “the  university  without 
conditions”, which to him involves an ambitious agenda thus defined: “the primal right to say 
anything, be it in the name of fiction and of knowledge as experiment, and the right to speak 
publicly, and to publish this”18. Habermas offers a more specialized version of what ought to 
be done, and has been insufficiently accomplished so far: integrating humanistic study and 
technical expertise to curb the specialization of knowledge19. 
This  may sound vague enough,  and we wonder  where it  might  lead,  because one 
doubts that knowledge, in our various disciplines, might efficiently refrain from specializing. 
This  is  why  Derrida  comes  up  with  more  practical  propositions  as  to  the  contents  and 
orientations  of  higher  education  in  the  book  he  published  in  2001,  L’Université  sans 
condition. There are seven such propositions, all having to do with what one might call the 
architecture of knowledge, all answering the need to redefine humanistic study, which should 
come alongside more specialized training, either in established scholarly disciplines, or the 
more mundane training of students towards the professions outside the academic world. The 
new humanities should, according to Derrida, deal with what he calls “the history of man”, 
which calls us to devote more attention than has so far been done to human rights, be they 
masculine  or  feminine.  To  him,  these  rights  are  “legal  performatives”20,  which  sounds 
otherworldly owing to the weight of abstraction in the phrase. However, this might basically 
mean that these rights are to be upheld because they have applicability in the various fields of 
human activity.  And we must  bear  in mind that  these so-called “legal  performatives” are 
performatives because they hold in them an applicability that may be constantly expanded, in 
16 Pye, 250. 
17 Habermas, 104. 
18 Jacques Derrida, L’Université sans condition, Paris, Galilée, 2001, 16. 
19 See « The Idea of the University », The New Conservatism, 100-127. 
20 Derrida, L’Université sans condition, 69. 
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practical terms, to various areas of cultural practice, among then of course, the sciences and 
business,  two areas of higher education that are fast  growing to meet  the social  needs of 
human development. 
The idea of democracy comes second in Derrida’s architecture of the new humanities. 
It comes second for reasons of clarity in his presentation of the programme he has in mind, 
yet the idea of democracy is not a second-thought, because it runs, let us remember, through 
all his oeuvre as a philosopher. Let us note that democracy, in what Derrida has to say about 
it, is not tethered to nationhood. Nationhood is dangerous, and one may easily understand this 
in the light of European history,  and also of Asia. From this, we infer easily that cultural 
change  in  the  future  should  not  rely  on  national  traditions,  and  that,  in  this  respect, 
globalization offers opportunities for positive cross-fertilization. Derrida’s meditation on this 
hinges on the concept  of sovereignty.  While  sovereignty is  a desirable  goal for each and 
everyone of us;  the idea is  viewed as misleading,  as it  has often been a  concept  without 
practical consequence, while we may still hope that sovereignty should remain for individuals 
as a horizon of belief, and as a value that should guide collective decisions. Yet, if Derrida 
invites  us  to  abide  by  this  concept,  sovereignty,  he  also  believes  that  any  collective 
formalization of the idea of sovereignty should avoid reliance on the nation-state, which may 
too easily lead to a betrayal of individual dignity. 
Derrida then focuses on the necessity to recuperate the authority of teaching, and of 
literature,  whose  proposals  cannot  be  easily  understood.  One  suspects,  when  reading 
Derrida’s proposals, that teaching, as well as literature, has to do with amity, one concept that 
emerges from Derrida’s body of works. This is not a norm, neither is it prescriptive, neither 
can it be strictly defined as a doctrine or a set of mandatory rules. We gather this is to be 
understood as an opening to otherness from the part of the teacher, and a eulogy of respect for 
the intimacy of the other person, which involves inventiveness and the by-passing of any sort 
of regulation that defines the other person in some way or other that might lead to a position 
of authority of a colonial or exploitative nature. It certainly is an attitude of respect, which 
elbows  aside  the  very  notion  of  authority,  “routs  it”,  as  Derrida  says21.  The  University, 
therefore, should be an idea that transcends any specialized discourse on the technicalities of 
education;  it  consists  in  letting  the  other  reach  out  for  his  or  her  potential  towards  self-
development. The institutional strength of higher education springs, in Derrida’s view of it, 
from the interaction of the person who teaches and the one being taught to live to the full his 
or her aspirations. Derrida’s ideal is so elevated that it transcends any definition one might 
come up with. It certainly is a call to confront the normative nature of higher education in 
order to recuperate a lost sense of human warmth that has been eliminated by the technocratic 
complexities of institutions seeking intellectual identity in the measurement of student skills 
and their willingness to comply to them. One also cannot rule out that a backlash has been on 
the way in higher education itself owing to the rising number of first-generation graduates 
among  the  less  educated  quarters  of  our  national  cultures.  This  has  been  more  of  an 
opportunity for universities to fulfil  their  cultural  mission from the sixties onwards than a 
serious  obstacle  to  the  growth  of  higher  education,  and  one  can  argue  that  Derrida  was 
balking away from the pessimistic discourse one hears in most academic circles today,  ill-
grounded as it is on the relative accessibility of higher education. 
The challenges that higher education has to face, in the context of an ever-increasing 
cross-fertilization  of  cultures,  points  to  one  underlying  question  that  surfaces  from  an 
examination of current economic and social trends. Is what we call culture tethered to social 
and economic factors? The question is by no means new, and was handed down to us by the 
industrial  revolutions  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  by Marxist  theory.  We now tend  to 
21 Derrida, L’Université sans condition, 72. 
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believe that  culture is one mode of collective representation that one may disengage from 
submission to social and economic fact, what the French sociologist Emile Durkheim called 
the real structures, that he saw as disconnected from institutions or working facts.22 There is 
still much thought to be devoted to whether the degree of autonomy of culture as collective  
representation involves radical or relative autonomy from economic factors. We are also hard 
pressed to determine whether, in this framework of analytical thinking, autonomy is or is not 
hampered by the necessities of those real structures and the institution that go to shape them, 
and even, perhaps discreetly justify them. Hence, Stiglitz’s view that one must respond to a 
democratic deficit, and Derrida’s view that one must face the serious issue of a democratic 
deficit in higher education. The question is not benign; and it calls forth an autonomy of the 
mind to bend social realities and economic factors to purposes that do not derive from them. 
22 On this, consider Daniel Parrochia,  La Forme des crises : logique et épistémologie, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 
2008, esp. 104-128. 
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The lecture shall explore cultural change in the context of the economic globalization 
under way. It aims at analyzing the role that theoretical inventiveness and ethical value play in 
fashioning  broader  cultural  representation  and  responsibility,  and  shall  explore  issues  of 
cultural disunity and conflict, while assessing the influence that leading intellectuals may have 
in promoting a finer perception of value worldwide. The role of higher education as an asset 
in the defence of democracy and individual self-development shall be discussed with a view 
to evaluating its potential for an altered course of globalization. 
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